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From a paper "We study an incomplete information game in which players are in-
volved in a reciprocal relationship that allows them to coordinate their actions
by contracting among themselves. We model this as a reciprocal contracting pro-
cedure, where players have the ability to make commitments contingent on the
others’commitments. We characterize the outcomes that can be supported as per-
fect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes in this reciprocal contracting game. We use
our characterization to show that the set of supportable outcomes is larger than
the set of outcomes supported by a centralized mechanism designer who can o¤er
contracts in which all players participate. The di¤erence is that the reciprocal
contracting game makes it possible for players to convey partial information about
their type at the time they o¤er contracts. We discuss the implications of our
analysis for modeling collusion between multiple agents interacting with the same

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